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Abstract: Many countries have suggested macroprudential supervision as a means for 
earlier identification and better control of the risks that might lead to a financial crisis.  
Since macroprudential supervision would focus on the financial system in its entirety and 
on major risks that could threaten financial stability, it shares many of the same goals as 
the financial stability reports written by most central banks.  This article examines the 
financial stability reports of five central banks to assess how effective they were in 
identifying the problems that led to the recent financial crisis and what implications they 
might have for macroprudential supervision. 
  The financial stability reports in these five countries were generally successful in 
foreseeing the risks that contributed to the crisis, but the reports underestimated the 
severity of the crisis and did not fully anticipate the timing and pattern of important 
events.  While the stress tests in these reports provided insights into the resiliency and 
capital needs of the banks in these countries, the stresses and scenarios tested often 
differed from what actually occurred and some of the reports did not consider them to be 
likely events.  One other major challenge for the central banks was in taking the concerns 
expressed in financial stability reports and linking them to effective and timely 
supervisory policy.  Overall, the reports were a worthwhile exercise in identifying and 
monitoring key financial trends and emerging risks, but they also indicate the significant 
challenges macroprudential supervision will have in anticipating and addressing financial 
market disruptions.       
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Many of the origins of the recent financial crisis were in the United States, 
beginning with subprime mortgages and mortgage-backed securities. However, this crisis 
quickly spread on a global basis, enveloping countries with similar asset price bubbles 
and rapid increases in debt levels. It hit nearly every other major country because of 
linkages through interconnected markets, foreign funding sources, and international trade.  
Few market participants or regulatory authorities saw this crisis coming, and all 
underestimated its severity. 
In every major country, the financial crisis is now sparking many proposals to 
address its perceived causes and prevent a recurrence. One idea for ensuring a more 
stable financial system that many central bankers and supervisory authorities are 
discussing is macroprudential supervision. Macroprudential supervision would attempt to 
focus supervision more on the financial system as a whole and on the overall risk to the 
economy. It would be a departure from the nearly exclusive reliance that supervisors have 
traditionally placed on microprudential supervision and its narrower goal of evaluating 
the condition of individual financial institutions. 
Macroprudential supervision is receiving much attention now because 
supervisors, with their focus on individual institutions, failed to recognize and address a 
number of the critical risk factors behind the crisis. These factors include a surge in 
housing prices and rising imbalances in financial markets due to rapid debt growth.  Also 
playing an important role in the crisis were common and interconnected exposures among 
institutions and the substantial growth in new and untested financial instruments, risk 
models, and funding and investment vehicles. 2 
 
Consequently, there is a growing consensus that supervisors could benefit from 
more of a macroprudential supervisory approach, and a number of such steps have 
already begun, including the European Systemic Risk Board and the recently legislated 
Financial Stability Oversight Council and its Office of Financial Research in the United 
States. However, there are numerous questions about how a macroprudential approach 
could be implemented. For instance, what financial measures and trends should be 
analyzed and modeled, how successful will this analysis be in identifying imbalances and 
other factors that could lead to a crisis, and how will any of this be translated into 
appropriate supervisory or other policy actions? 
Fortunately, most central banks already perform much of this role through the 
financial stability reports (FSRs) that they publish. These reports review the condition of the 
financial system, identify and assess major risks to the system, and suggest market or policy 
changes to address significant risk concerns. The reports are written on a regular basis, 
which provides a good perspective on how financial risks might be changing over time.  
Moreover, the primary goal of an FSR is to promote financial stability, thus linking FSRs 
closely to the expectations many have for macroprudential supervision.  
The recent financial crisis provides a good opportunity to assess the effectiveness 
of these reports and, in turn, what macroprudential supervision might be able to 
accomplish and the challenges supervisors might face in adopting this approach. This 
article analyzes the FSRs prepared by five European countries that were affected by the 
financial crisis—the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway. We 
examine whether the reports gave the central bankers and others useful information 
before and during the crisis.  3 
 
Our analysis finds that the FSRs in these five countries were generally successful 
in identifying the risks that played important roles in the crisis—although the reports 
were less certain in deciding which risks might be realized, and the severity of the crisis 
was underestimated in nearly all the reports. While the FSRs may not have provided a 
full warning of this crisis, it would be a mistake to say that they didn‘t provide useful 
information and insights. These reports, in fact, may have given central banks and other 
public authorities a better understanding of the underlying structure of financial markets 
and the problems that would arise during the crisis, including whether such problems 
would result in liquidity or solvency issues. The FSRs may have further helped 
policymakers in deciding what actions should be taken. These results suggest that 
macroprudential supervision could offer similar benefits, as well as many of the same 
challenges.   
The first section of the article describes the concept of macroprudential 
supervision and looks at FSRs and their purpose, benefits, and general characteristics. 
The second section gives a brief overview of the financial crisis. The following section 
discusses the FSRs of the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway. These 
discussions highlight the unique aspects of the crisis in each country and the risks 
identified by the FSRs. A final section evaluates the effectiveness of FSRs and examines 
what they might tell us about macroprudential supervision.  
I.  MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORTS 
The topic of macroprudential supervision has been discussed for a number of 
years, including before the current crisis. It has yet to play a formal and well-defined role 4 
 
in supervision, although supervisors historically have tried to consider the broader 
financial environment and its implications for individual financial institutions and their 
risk exposure. Macroprudential supervision, though, would take this broader view of the 
financial environment and its stability a step further and incorporate it more directly into 
a countercyclical approach to supervision. 
While the use of macroprudential supervision is still in its infancy, financial 
stability reports have become an increasingly important tool over the last decade or so for 
promoting stability. One study notes that in 2005 almost 50 central banks published an 
FSR (Čihák (2006)).
1 The United States is the only major industrialized country that has 
not published one. However, the Federal Reserve and other U.S. regulatory authorities 
have regular surveillance and monitoring programs, and recent U.S. financial legislation 
will require the Office of Financial Research to begin reporting to Congress annually on 
financial stability.
2 Both macroprudential supervision and FSRs are described below, 
along with their potential for promoting financial stability. 
Macroprudential supervision 
Macroprudential supervision has been defined in a number of ways, but its basic 
objective is to develop a supervisory approach that is focused on ensuring the stability of 
the financial system in its entirety, while limiting systemwide financial distress and any 
resulting effect on the overall economy (Crockett (2000), Borio (2003), Group of Thirty 
(2010)). Macroprudential supervision thus represents a departure from the more 
traditional microprudential supervision, which focuses on the risks taken on by individual 
institutions in isolation (idiosyncratic risk) and whether these institutions are sound. 
Macroprudential supervision, in contrast, would look at factors that could affect the 5 
 
stability of the financial system (systematic risk) and, in turn, the general economy. This 
could include giving greater attention to the largest institutions as systemic threats, 
examining common exposures and counterparty linkages among major institutions and 
markets, and any shocks that could develop from asset bubbles, credit expansion and 
leverage, and macroeconomic conditions (Borio (2003)). 
On a more practical level, macroprudential supervision would entail monitoring 
systematic risk and designing supervisory steps to limit or address this type of risk in a 
timely manner.  Financial researchers have suggested and, in some cases, tested a variety 
of indicators as macro-risk measures, including standard balance sheet or ―financial 
soundness‖ indicators, indicators constructed from market prices, early warning 
indicators and financial stress indexes based on such factors as debt and asset price 
trends, and macro stress tests (Borio and Drehmann (2009), Smaghi (2009)). 
Macroprudential supervision would also rely on a number of new or revised 
supervisory and policy steps. These policy approaches can be divided into three basic, but 
sometimes overlapping, categories: (1) countercyclical regulatory steps that may take the 
form of automatic, built-in stabilizers, (2) improved measures to deal with contagion, and 
(3) discretionary policies to address major threats to financial stability. 
Among the suggested countercyclical approaches are regulations that would 
require financial institutions to strengthen their capital, liquidity, reserves, and/or loan-to-
value ratios during more prosperous times to levels that would be sufficient to withstand 
periods of significant distress (Crockett (2000), Borio (2003), Group of Thirty (2010)). 
One current example of this is the dynamic provisioning process introduced in Spain in 6 
 
early 2000, which requires Spanish banks to not only provision against individual 
identified loan losses (specific provision), but also set aside general provisions that reflect 
recent credit growth, historical and current specific provisions, and the average level of 
losses in a non-cyclical year (Saurina (2009)). 
Another example is the Basel III agreement announced in September 2010, which 
calls for institutions to hold a capital conservation buffer and to build up a countercyclical 
capital buffer during periods when a country is experiencing excess credit growth (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), Caruana (2010)). This countercyclical capital 
buffer is to be composed of common equity or other fully loss absorbing capital in an 
amount of up to 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets. In a similar manner, the recent Dodd-
Frank financial reform legislation in the United States will require federal banking 
agencies to make their capital requirements countercyclical, so that the amount of 
required capital ―increases in times of economic expansion and decreases in times of 
economic contraction.‖  
Measures to address contagion risk could encompass stronger regulation and 
supervision of systemically important institutions, monitoring and control of large 
counterparty exposures, and strengthening of clearing and settlement systems. The Dodd-
Frank legislation in the United States, for instance, calls for all systemically significant 
firms, including nonbank financial companies, to be subject to more stringent oversight 
by the Federal Reserve.  
Discretionary approaches to macroprudential supervision could follow a 
somewhat different format than the countercyclical and contagion measures. In many 7 
 
cases, these responses would be unique and would be whatever was necessary to correct 
large imbalances and significant risk exposures as they develop within the economy and 
financial system. For this discretionary form of macroprudential supervision to prove 
successful, policymakers would have to first identify the risks in a timely manner and 
then develop policy responses that would be effective and appropriate to the task. As a 
result, this form of macroprudential supervision would involve substantial challenges 
with regard to collecting and analyzing data on financial risks, identifying significant and 
real threats to financial stability, and designing the correct policy actions.           
Financial stability reports 
FSRs have the goal of promoting financial stability by identifying risks, 
imbalances, and adverse trends that might threaten the financial system. One of the first 
steps most countries take in producing FSRs is to develop a workable definition of 
financial stability. Financial stability can be difficult to define and has been used to 
describe a wide range of conditions. Financial stability can refer to the absence of a 
financial crisis or the ―smooth functioning of the key elements that make up the financial 
system.‖
3 Alternatively, it can apply to financial systems that are robust and able to 
withstand various shocks or risk exposures. The Bank of England‘s December 2009 FSR 
states that a ―stable financial system is able to sustain critical services to the wider 
economy—payments, credit provision and insurance against risk—even when it is hit by 
unanticipated events.‖
4 This definition of financial stability, which includes resistance to 
shocks, has been widely adopted by writers of financial stability reports.
5 Given this 
definition, an FSR should look for risks and shocks that are large enough to interrupt the 
smooth functioning of the financial system.  8 
 
  Potential benefits of FSRs. FSRs can promote stability by providing information 
that allows the central bank, other regulatory authorities, and market participants to 
understand the risks and potential problems that threaten the smooth functioning of the 
financial system. With timely information, regulatory authorities and market participants 
may be able to take actions to address such threats before they cause serious problems. 
This information may also be useful in understanding and developing sound policy 
responses in the midst of a crisis.  
An FSR can help ensure a stable financial system by bringing a systemic focus to 
risk management. While market participants may be aware of risks at an individual or 
micro level, they may fail to see the build-up or the effect of risk taking at a broader level 
across the entire financial system.
6 This need for a more comprehensive view of risk 
exposure can be addressed if an FSR helps identify systemwide threats to financial 
stability and gives policymakers and supervisory authorities the insights needed to 
improve the financial infrastructure. As a result, FSRs seek to accomplish many of the 
same things as macroprudential supervision, although their link to supervision can be a 
little less direct, particularly if a central bank is not involved in supervision.  
Publishing an FSR for public consumption on a regular basis also has advantages. 
Central banks undertake a wide range of surveillance activities, not all of which are 
suitable for public distribution.
7 However, by publishing an FSR, a central bank increases 
the transparency of its activities and concerns. Market participants that follow an FSR‘s 
results over time may be better able to interpret and respond to the results. Finally, having 
an FSR reviewed by the public and market participants should increase accountability 
and encourage the central bank to be more careful, accurate, and precise in preparing its 
reports. These factors should enhance the credibility of an FSR over time. 9 
 
In short, an FSR may improve communication and cooperation between 
regulatory authorities and market participants and among regulatory authorities within or 
across nations. An FSR may help identify common risks and threats to financial 
institutions and enable market participants to better understand and respond to the 
concerns of their regulatory authorities. And, by providing a better understanding of 
common risks in different countries, FSRs may assist regulatory authorities in their 
efforts to cooperate more effectively on a global basis.  
  Characteristics of FSRs. In writing FSRs, central banks must decide what 
information, aspects of financial markets, and mode of analysis will provide the clearest 
assessment of financial stability within a country. An FSR is usually forward looking: it 
tries to identify and evaluate potential future problems that can impair stability. FSRs 
generally have a systemic focus. While it is necessary and important to evaluate 
individual institutions on a supervisory level, an FSR needs to assess risks to the financial 
system as a whole. Problems at individual institutions are important to the extent that 
they may create instability at the system level. In this regard, FSRs have much the same 
focus on risk as macroprudential supervision.  
An FSR strives to identify and assess significant risks to a country‘s financial 
system. In writing FSRs, many countries divide these sources of risk into three broad 
categories—macroeconomic conditions or sectoral imbalances; financial sector risks; and 
external or international sources of risk.  
Weaknesses in a country‘s macroeconomy pose a myriad of risks for the financial 
system. In this regard, an economic recession can lead to an increase in loan defaults and 
bond downgrades that may affect the solvency of financial institutions and, in turn, the 10 
 
overall functioning of the financial system. Sectoral imbalances refer to potential 
problems in the nonfinancial sectors of the economy that can spill over into the financial 
sector. Examples include the build-up of excessive levels of debt or leverage in the 
household or corporate sectors, which could lead to stresses and defaults that would 
impair financial stability. 
Financial sector risks can stem from problems at individual firms, common 
practices or exposures at financial institutions, financial market conditions, and 
weaknesses in the financial infrastructure. Failure or significant distress at a large 
financial firm could lead to breakdowns in the financial system if other firms are 
counterparties with large exposures to the distressed firm. Systemic effects could also 
arise from problems that are common to many firms. For example, in the recent crisis, 
many institutions held complex and illiquid mortgage-related securities that incurred 
large losses as the crisis unfolded. Volatile market conditions and asset price bubbles can 
further lead to financial instability. Other risks can arise from the financial infrastructure, 
including the payments systems, trade clearing and settlement systems, risk management 
systems of market participants, and the regulatory oversight system. Weaknesses in this 
infrastructure, for instance, can disrupt payments and financial flows or lead to losses 
from risks that could have been managed or avoided. 
External or international exposures can also have a significant effect on financial 
stability. With increasingly connected, global financial markets, problems in one country 
can now be transmitted quickly to other countries. Furthermore, large financial 
institutions are likely to operate in multiple countries, so the failure of one of these 
institutions can affect financial conditions in each of the countries where it has 
operations. 11 
 
FSRs typically assess each significant risk that might arise from the categories 
above and evaluate whether the risk is increasing and likely to be realized. This 
assessment usually includes the potential effect on the financial system if the risk is 
realized. 
There are a number of approaches FSRs take to identify and assess risks. One 
approach is to use common financial indicators and ratios, based on currently reported 
data. The IMF has suggested a list of financial soundness indicators designed to assess 
the financial health of a country‘s banking system, nonbank financial intermediaries, and 
the nonfinancial sectors of the economy (Sundararajan et al. (2002)). These indicators 
include capital-to-asset ratios, liquid assets-to-short-term liability ratios, and return on 
assets for financial institutions; household debt-to-GDP and debt service-to-income 
ratios; and debt-to-equity and return on equity ratios for nonfinancial corporations.
8 Such 
indicators can provide useful information about the present state of the financial system, 
but they may be less helpful in evaluating future conditions and risks.  
Many FSRs also look at market-based indicators as a means of providing a 
forward–looking perspective that reflects the views of many highly motivated market 
participants. For example, spreads on credit default swaps provide a market assessment of 
the creditworthiness of individual firms or sectors of the market. Other market-based 
indicators include stock prices, stock index values, and interest rate spreads on 
subordinated debt issued by financial institutions. Compared to common financial 
indicators and ratios, market-based indicators are likely to be more timely because they 
are based on investor expectations rather than on accounting data that may be dated.  
In addition, FSRs may identify risks using qualitative indicators and analysis. 
Many central banks have access to supervisory evaluations or other qualitative 12 
 
information. More generally, reports must rely on the insights and analysis of those 
preparing the report and their expertise in detecting risks and assessing threats to 
financial stability. 
Beyond identifying the potential threats to financial stability, FSRs often attempt 
to assess the likelihood and severity of these threats or risks—and how they may change 
over time. Such assessments may be based on an analysis of financial or market 
indicators and trends or on a subjective analysis prepared by the report‘s authors. FSRs 
further use stress testing and scenario analysis to estimate how the conditions of financial 
firms or sectors might change given a specified change in market or economic conditions. 
Stress tests and scenario analysis rely on mathematical models or computer simulations to 
estimate the effects of a significant change in economic or market conditions on financial 
institutions. For example, a central bank might try to model the effects of a large increase 
in interest rates or loan losses on the banking system‘s capital and earnings. The 
usefulness of these techniques depends on the types of scenarios that are run and whether 
the underlying model of the financial system is realistic. 
Each of these approaches to identifying and assessing risks has its own strengths 
and weaknesses. For a thorough evaluation of threats to the financial system, FSRs 
typically base their risk assessments on several approaches. 
Risk evaluations and assessments require an extensive amount of information and 
data. Most countries regularly collect data on the condition of financial firms and debt 
levels of the household and business sectors. Some central banks collect additional data 
or undertake special surveys to get additional information. For example, the Sveriges 
Riksbank, the Swedish central bank, conducts a quarterly survey of counterparty 
exposures at Sweden‘s largest banks, thus providing a good indication of how problems 13 
 
at one institution might affect others. Regular data collection is also important during a 
financial crisis because it provides transparency, can guide policy actions, and helps 
reduce the type of uncertainty that could lead to a loss of public confidence. 
The approaches that FSRs take to identify and measure risk thus reflect much of 
what supervisors would have to do in a macroprudential supervisory approach. As a 
result, FSRs provide a good perspective on what the contributions of macroprudential 
supervision might be and what challenges it is likely to face. 
II.  CRISIS OVERVIEW 
Before reviewing FSRs to assess their ability to anticipate and help react to the 
recent financial crisis, this section briefly reviews the significant factors and risks that led 
up to the crisis. Ideally, an FSR and a macroprudential supervisor would have identified 
these factors before or during the early stages of the crisis. This overview looks at how 
the crisis began and spread globally. 
While a wide variety of factors contributed to the recent financial crisis, the most 
common element was a substantial underestimation of the inherent risks in many 
financial activities. Leading up to the crisis, a long period of prosperity, low inflation, and 
low interest rates in most major countries contributed to a highly optimistic economic 
environment—one characterized by historically low credit risk spreads on financial 
instruments, rapid credit expansion, and large increases in housing prices. High public 
and private savings rates in Asian countries also helped keep interest rates low and 
provided funds to finance rising debt levels in other countries. 
Within financial markets, a number of developments and innovations led to a 
more fragile and vulnerable system. These included lax lending standards, misaligned 14 
 
incentives in the securitization process for mortgages and other debt instruments, and an 
over-reliance on ratings agencies. Other significant factors were the growth of highly 
complex and opaque financial instruments, increased use of short-term funding to finance 
long-term assets, a wide array of counterparty exposures among financial institutions, and 
risk management practices and models that were less effective than many had anticipated. 
The initial impetus to the financial crisis was rapidly declining house prices in the 
United States. This trend led to significant repayment problems and rising foreclosures in 
the subprime real estate market beginning in 2007. Through a variety of channels, problems 
spread to other parts of U.S. financial markets, particularly as the crisis deepened in the fall 
of 2008. Subprime mortgage-backed securities had been incorporated into a wide variety of 
complex financial instruments. Rapidly declining values of subprime securities cast doubt 
on the value of other financial instruments and the condition of institutions that held them. 
These problems also spread to other major countries and foreign institutions 
through their holdings of U.S. financial instruments and through comparable trends in 
their own mortgage and credit markets. Declining asset values, in turn, led to further 
liquidity, capital, and public confidence problems—both in the United States and abroad. 
Other related events included trading breakdowns in certain markets, bailouts and failures 
of major institutions, deterioration in interbank markets, and serious liquidity issues 
associated with the excessive dependence on short-term funding. All of these financial 
problems resulted in more general economic problems. As economic activity declined, 
lenders became less willing or able to extend credit, causing economic activity to decline 
further. Unemployment increased in many countries as GDP decreased, leading to a drop-
off in international trade and the start of a global recession. 
The financial crisis affected the United States and the five countries whose FSRs 15 
 
we examine in several different ways. The United States and a number of other countries, 
including the UK, were at the center of the crisis due to a combination of liberal lending 
standards, significant collapses in their housing markets, and their banks‘ reliance on 
complex instruments. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, were affected early in the 
crisis due to losses on complex securities and related liquidity problems. Many of the 
remaining countries, including Sweden, Spain, and Norway avoided these more direct 
effects but suffered from the global recession, decreased international trade, and the 
decline in global liquidity. 
Of the five countries in this study, all but Norway suffered a GDP decline of 
around 5 percent or more, notable increases in unemployment, and, in most cases, some 
serious banking problems (See Table 1).  The crisis had a relatively moderate impact on 
the Norway economy, while the Spanish economy is still experiencing declining real 
estate markets, slow economic activity, and very high unemployment. These differences 
are important in assessing the type of risks that the UK, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, 
and Norway identified in their FSRs, which are examined in the next section. 
III.  REVIEW OF FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORTS 
This section reviews the FSRs of five countries from 2006 to 2010 and evaluates 
their effectiveness in identifying the risks that contributed to the financial crisis. The UK, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway all have considerable experience in 
preparing FSRs and thus provide good models for examining these reports. In addition, 
each country published reports leading up to and throughout the financial crisis and was 
affected by the crisis either directly or by the resulting global liquidity and economic 
problems. To supplement the discussion below, Tables 2, 3, and 4 of this paper further 16 
 
summarize the risks identified in the FSRs and the information and tests each central 
bank used to assess these risks.  
The UK: The Bank of England’s Financial Stability Report 
In many respects, conditions in UK financial markets leading up to the crisis 
mirrored those in the United States. The country and its financial markets could be 
characterized by a booming housing market, lax residential lending standards, substantial 
holdings of complex and opaque securities and derivatives, highly leveraged financial 
institutions, and a heavy reliance on short-term financing.  
As the crisis unfolded, these conditions caused significant losses at many UK 
financial institutions. Credit concerns led to funding problems for Northern Rock, one of 
the largest mortgage lenders, causing it to seek liquidity support from the Bank of England 
and become nationalized in February 2008. In the third quarter of 2008, credit and 
interbank markets came close to freezing up, and asset and equity prices fell sharply, 
leading to the failure of several other UK financial firms. In September 2008, Lloyds TSB 
acquired the failing HBOS, the largest UK mortgage lender. Bradford & Bingley, a 
building society, was partly nationalized and partly sold to Abbey Bank, a subsidiary of the 
Spanish bank Santander. The Royal Bank of Scotland was effectively nationalized in 
October 2008 as the UK Treasury took a majority stake in the company.  
UK banking problems also affected the underlying economy. Bank losses led to a 
decline in lending to the household and corporate sectors, contributing to slower growth 
and higher unemployment. This caused further home price depreciation, debt service 
stress, and personal insolvencies, which put additional pressure on bank balance sheets. 
Risk identification. The Bank of England‘s FSRs identified many of the risks that 17 
 
later would play a role in the financial crisis. The 2006 report noted potential problems in 
low risk premiums for financial instruments, which might have indicated inflated asset 
prices. Also noted were large trade imbalances between countries and the risk that these 
imbalances might unwind in a disorderly manner. The report cited risks from growing 
leverage in the corporate sector, highly indebted households, potential infrastructure 
disruptions, and growth in large complex financial institutions and their rising 
interconnectivity. The 2006 FSR also suggested that potential problems could be 
systemically amplified by various factors, such as illiquid instruments triggering a 
downward spiral in prices, increased dependence on wholesale funding, and growing 
counterparty exposures. Later reports discussed additional risks, including potential 
problems in wholesale markets and concerns over the valuation of complex assets. 
Except for trade imbalances, risks noted in the reports were all realized in some way 
during the crisis. 
The analysis in the FSRs relied on extensive use of market data, vendor data, and 
regulatory data to evaluate trends, developments, and risks in the financial system. For 
example, the FSRs kept track of counterparty exposures among the largest financial 
institutions, including their off-balance sheet exposures. In addition, the FSRs conducted 
several market surveys, a few of which were instigated during the crisis, such as the 
credit conditions survey and the systemic risk survey. 
Risk evaluation. The evaluation of these risks was based on an analysis of the 
information used to identify the risks and systemic stress testing of the resilience of UK 
banks (Box 1). The stress tests generally showed that each individual risk would not 
significantly reduce the capital base of UK institutions. However, the reports cautioned 
that more than one risk could be triggered and amplified during a severe negative shock. 18 
 
As the initial phase of the crisis broke out, the FSRs noted shortfalls in the quantification 
of the interaction between market liquidity and funding.  
Assessing the likelihood and severity of the risks identified in the Bank of 
England‘s FSRs proved to be challenging. One report noted: ―It is much harder to judge 
the level of threats than to assess how they are evolving.‖
9 The UK‘s FSRs clearly 
underestimated the potential problems they identified. As subprime issues were surfacing 
in the United States and mortgage securities were being downgraded, the FSRs concluded 
that the U.S. subprime market was too small to have any systemic effect on the UK. The 
reports, though, suggested that subprime problems could potentially spill over to a loss of 
confidence in credit quality, which could affect the market for other structured securities. 
The April 2008 FSR reported that markets most likely had overreacted, allowing asset 
prices to fall too far. Although expressing caution about further declines, the reports 
thought the most probable outcome would be a recovery. In fact, the crisis became 
significantly worse in September 2008. 
Sweden: The Sveriges Riksbank’s Financial Stability Report 
The Swedish financial system largely escaped the initial phase of the current 
financial crisis and the housing collapses that occurred in a number of other countries. 
While house prices in Sweden more than doubled between 1995 and 2007, they fell by 
only about 8 percent in the crisis and have more than fully recovered since then.
10 
After the financial crisis worsened in the fall of 2008, however, Swedish banks 
began to have trouble obtaining longer maturity funding, which significantly increased 
funding costs. In response, Swedish authorities took a series of steps to ease liquidity 
problems, including state guarantees of bank liabilities and increased issuance of treasury 19 
 
bills by the National Debt Office. The Sveriges Riksbank provided liquidity assistance to 
banks, cut the central bank repo rate from 4.75 percent in September 2008 to 0.25 percent 
by July 2009, and entered into currency swaps with other central banks. Even with these 
actions, the Swedish economy slowed substantially as corporate bankruptcies, business 
debt problems, and unemployment all increased in response to a worsening global 
economy. 
Risk identification. Several of the FSRs issued before the crisis identified 
concerns that later became important factors in the financial crisis. Historically low credit 
spreads and risk premiums were mentioned in the 2006 reports, which suggested that 
investors were turning to riskier assets to obtain higher yields, but without insisting on 
sufficient compensation for the risks. The reports also stated that an abrupt change in 
expectations and desire for more secure investments could lead to market unrest and 
greatly impaired liquidity in financial markets. And, as early as 2006, the reports cited 
concerns that the rapid growth of credit derivatives and hedge funds could allow 
disruptions to spread quickly from one market to another. 
All of the FSRs from 2006 to 2009 suggested that the large credit exposures of 
several Swedish banks in the Baltic States posed a risk. The reports warned that a 
slowdown in the rapid economic growth and credit expansion in the Baltics might lead to 
large loan losses. With most of this lending denominated in euros, the reports mentioned an 
exchange rate risk in these loans. The second report in 2008 noted a more abrupt slowdown 
in the Baltic States than was previously expected. 
As the financial crisis deepened, the FSRs identified a number of other risks, 
particularly concerning liquidity and credit quality. The risks were tied to the turbulence 
in foreign financial markets, sharp increases in short-term wholesale funding costs, and a 20 
 
fall in the value of some assets at Swedish banks. Other factors were a significant 
dependence of Swedish banks on international wholesale funding and sharp increases in 
corporate lending, including lending to property companies at seemingly small margins. 
Soon, rising unemployment, deterioration in the financial condition of companies, rising 
corporate bankruptcies, falling housing and property prices, and substantial GDP declines 
in the Baltic countries were also cited as signs of worsening economic conditions and 
increasing financial risk. 
Risk evaluation. To evaluate how the credit, liquidity, and contagion risks would 
affect the largest Swedish banks, the Riksbank conducted a number of stress tests on the 
country‘s four largest banks, as well as a household debt stress test. The tests were 
repeated throughout the financial crisis to gauge the resilience of banks as the crisis 
worsened. The credit quality tests were divided into several scenarios: 1) a substantial 
deterioration in creditworthiness within the Baltic countries; 2) impaired credit quality 
such as occurred during the 2000 downturn; and 3) a more severe credit test, which was 
added in the second 2008 report and was patterned after the Swedish property crisis of 
the early 1990s.
11 Generally, these tests found the largest Swedish banks would be able to 
cope with such developments. From one FSR to the next, though, the tests showed a 
pattern of decline in the banks‘ overall financial strength as the crisis worsened, until the 
second 2009 report noted an improvement.    
The Riksbank conducted several contagion and liquidity stress tests during the 
crisis as questions arose about the condition of counterparties and as funding markets 
collapsed. The Riksbank‘s contagion stress tests used quarterly data collected from the 
major Swedish banks on their 15 largest counterparty exposures to estimate what would 
happen if one of the counterparties collapsed (Box 2). These tests found that the 21 
 
contagion risk was moderate and declined throughout much of the crisis due to 
government guarantees and reduced interbank exposures. To test for liquidity stress, the 
Riksbank estimated how bank operating profits would be affected by higher funding 
costs. The tests found that profitability would decline, but not critically. 
Based on the stress tests and other factors, the second 2009 FSR issued by the 
Riksbank viewed any recovery as likely to be slow and still vulnerable to new shocks. 
The FSRs provided a reasonable and generally accurate assessment of how the identified 
risks would affect the profitability, capital, and resiliency of the four largest banks, 
although the reports did not fully anticipate the depth and nature of the liquidity crisis in 
the Swedish financial system. 
The Netherlands: The De Nederlandsche Bank’s Financial Stability Report 
The Netherlands has a relatively small economic and financial system, both of 
which are integrated with the EU countries and the United States. As a result, the 
financial crisis in the United States and UK hit the Dutch financial system in a similar 
way with only a short time lag. Dutch banks experienced losses on their holdings of 
mortgage-related and other complex securities. Market liquidity problems caused Dutch 
banks to ―re-intermediate‖—that is, to bring back onto their balance sheets securities 
previously moved off–balance sheet into special investment vehicles. Thus, funding 
requirements increased, adding stress to liquidity conditions at Dutch banks. 
The financial crisis led to bank failures and to the nationalization of a significant 
banking operation in the Netherlands. ABN AMRO, the largest Dutch institution, was 
acquired in 2007 by a consortium of Royal Bank of Scotland, Fortis, and Banco 
Santander. Fortis, a Belgian banking and insurance company, assumed control of ABN 22 
 
AMRO‘s Dutch operations. In 2008, Fortis suffered significant losses and a liquidity run, 
which required intervention and assistance from the Belgian, Dutch, and French 
governments. The Dutch government obtained full control of all Fortis operations in the 
Netherlands, including the former activities of ABN AMRO. As a result, almost one-third 
of the Dutch banking system came under government control. 
Risk identification. The FSRs of the De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) identified 
risks to the financial system both leading up to and during the crisis. The reports noted 
higher leverage and interest rate risk in the corporate sector and external risks, such as 
potential foreign exchange risks that might arise from a disorderly correction of global 
trade imbalances or from risks spreading from the U.S. financial system. Reports in 2006 
and 2007 noted that banks were searching for higher yields and raising their risk 
tolerance, causing them to invest in more complex, less transparent, and potentially 
riskier financial instruments. Pointing to increasing leverage both within and outside the 
financial system, the March 2007 report suggested that ―an abrupt correction . . . in the 
event of, say, a resurgence of risk aversion, could result in serious market turbulence.‖
12 
The reports cautioned that the growth of complex and less transparent financial 
instruments had left the financial system more vulnerable to liquidity problems. The 
reports also identified weaknesses in the risk measurement systems in Dutch financial 
institutions.  
The DNB uses a number of approaches to identify and assess risks. It has access 
to a wide range of data for the household, corporate, and Dutch and international 
financial sectors. The bank uses financial ratios to assess the current condition of 
financial firms.
13 Market-based information is frequently used to measure risk to financial 
firms. For example, the September 2008 report uses charts of credit default swap spreads 23 
 
and stock prices to show the market‘s perception of increasing risk to Dutch financial 
firms.
14 
Risk evaluation. The primary tool for assessing the potential impact of the risks 
was scenario analysis. The reports used both a ―top–down‖ scenario analysis, which was 
run by the DNB, and a ―bottom–up‖ approach, in which individual banks were asked to 
implement and run the analysis. The identified risks were used to construct up to four 
stress scenarios.
15 The March 2007 report also discussed a bottom-up liquidity scenario 
run by Dutch banks. This range of scenarios covered the primary risks facing the Dutch 
financial institutions at the time the report was prepared. 
The scenario analyses performed reasonably well in measuring risks to the 
financial system, although the results appear to have underestimated the full exposures to 
the banks and the financial system. While the scenario results showed that bank earnings 
and capital declined under the adverse scenarios, earnings remained positive and capital 
was above regulatory minimums for most banks, leading to the conclusion that the banks 
were adequately protected. However, bank losses and capital declines during the crisis 
were larger than anticipated in the simulations. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it appears that the adverse scenarios were not 
adverse enough and the DNB was aware that its scenario analysis might underestimate 
risk. As noted in the March 2007 report, ―in the event of a financial crisis, all kinds of 
second-order effects may materialize—resulting from, for example, confidence effects 
and herd behavior—which are difficult to quantify and may be underestimated in the 
hypothetical scenarios.‖
16 This accurately describes what, in fact, occurred with the 
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Spain: The Banco de España’s Financial Stability Report 
Leading up to the crisis, Spain experienced one of the most substantial economic 
expansions among all developed countries, coupled with significant house price 
appreciation and increasing debt levels, both in the household and the corporate sectors. 
Consequently, Spain‘s output and employment growth became increasingly dependent on 
the real estate sector. 
As in Sweden, the initial phase of the financial crisis had a muted effect on 
Spanish banks due to insignificant exposure to U.S. subprime or other hard-to-value 
instruments.
17 As the financial crisis worsened in late 2008, Spain‘s real estate market 
declined more rapidly, the economy slumped into recession, and banks cut back on new 
lending. Household spending consequently declined and the downturn spread to the 
business sector. Unemployment rose to 20 percent in June 2010—a level only reached by 
Latvia in the euro area. 
In response, the Spanish government implemented fiscal stimulus, expanded 
deposit guarantees, guaranteed certain debt, and recapitalized institutions. Even with 
these actions, two savings banks were taken over by the government, Caja Castilla-La 
Mancha in early 2009 and Cajasur in May 2010. In July 2010, the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors carried out stress testing on European banks with the 
national supervisory authorities and the European Central Bank. The stress test resulted 
in an additional capital infusion of about €1.8 billion (or $2.4 billion) at four Spanish 
savings banks. Other Spanish banks have so far endured the crisis, but considerable 
challenges remain, especially for the savings banks that are more exposed to the real 
estate sector. 
Risk identification. Early on, the Spanish FSRs noted many of the risks that would 25 
 
later play a role in the crisis. These included global imbalances, low risk premiums and 
interest rates, the effects of changing risk perceptions on liquidity, and potential problems 
in certain U.S. and UK markets due to complex credit products and housing booms. 
Additional domestic risks identified were rising household and private-sector debt levels 
and rapid growth in lending, especially in the real estate sector, which was increasingly 
being funded in wholesale markets. As the crisis progressed, these risks became more 
pronounced, as evidenced by increases in doubtful asset ratios and the deteriorating 
global and domestic economy.
18 
Risk evaluation. To evaluate these identified risks, the FSRs mainly looked at 
financial statement and regulatory data using trend and ratio analysis. Some of these 
ratios and performance estimates were compared with previous periods in Spain and to 
European peers to assess the level of risk. Market data (such as stock prices, credit 
default swap prices, exchange rates, etc) were also used, though to a lesser degree. As a 
result, the data often experienced an inherent time lag, which limited forward–looking 
analysis. To calculate default rates, the FSRs also used the Banco de España‘s Central 
Credit Register—a comprehensive database on any loan over €6,000 originated in Spain. 
The reports found the default rates to be much lower than on U.S. subprime loans, and 
such information was further used in stress tests and to calculate probabilities of default.   
Unlike the FSRs in some other countries, the Spanish reports did not 
systematically conduct stress testing. Instead, the FSRs conducted a few selected stress 
tests on certain risks.  These stress tests first appeared in the fall 2006 report where a 
scenario of economic stagnation and dramatically higher interest rates was used to 
analyze the impact on bank losses and profits. The following FSR, May 2007, tested a 
scenario in which GDP declined for four consecutive quarters at a magnitude similar to 26 
 
Spain‘s 1993 recession. The results indicated that the doubtful asset ratio at the end of 
2007 would stay well below 1993 levels. 
Other stress tests looked at bank credit exposures to corporations, the ability of 
depository institutions to operate in a constrained liquidity environment, and the 
performance of bonds and loans under a severely adverse scenario with significant house 
price declines. All tests found that Spanish depository institutions would be able to 
withstand the turmoil.   
The assumptions used in many of the stress tests were thought, at the time, to be 
severe and highly unlikely, but in hindsight, these assumptions clearly underestimated the 
risk to the Spanish economy. Several stress tests, for instance, assumed a GDP decline 
similar to that of the 1993 recession. However, the current decline has been much deeper 
and more prolonged than in 1993. The reports also recognized the difficulty in assessing 
the risk of potential shocks to markets. For example, the May 2007 FSR cautioned that 
financial innovation (such as credit derivatives) may have made the financial system 
more resilient, but at the same time decreased transparency and made it harder to 
determine, with any accuracy, the outcome of shocks. 
Norway: The Norges Bank’s Financial Stability Report 
The financial crisis had much less of an effect on Norway compared to most other 
European countries. During the worst part of the crisis in late 2008 and early 2009, 
Norway encountered several quarters of mild declines in economic output, but after that 
the Norwegian economy began growing again and unemployment has remained very low 
throughout the entire crisis. This economic and financial resilience can be attributed to 
such factors as the support the oil and gas sector provides to the economy, the substantial 27 
 
macroeconomic stimulus provided by the Norwegian government and Norges Bank, and 
Norway‘s limited reliance on the type of securities and financial and economic activities 
that suffered the most during the crisis.   
For Norwegian financial institutions, the greatest problem resulting from the crisis 
was funding. Because the major financial institutions in Norway had used foreign sources 
to help fund their growth in lending, these institutions experienced liquidity shocks after 
Lehman‘s bankruptcy and the ensuing global crash in interbank markets. To counter 
these liquidity problems, the Norges Bank and the Ministry of Finance took a series of 
steps, including a substantial reduction in the central bank‘s key policy rate, increases in 
its lending to banks and easier requirements for such lending, and additional lending 
through currency swap arrangements. Other key steps were a program allowing banks to 
exchange covered bonds for government securities and a Norwegian State Finance Fund 
to help banks restore capital levels. This assistance helped Norwegian banks avoid more 
prolonged liquidity problems, although the global downturn led to moderate declines in 
bank profitability, capital, and asset quality in Norway. 
Risk Identification. In its FSRs prior to December 2007, the Norges Bank 
generally viewed financial conditions as stable, but with some longer-term and rising 
risks. Among the risks cited in the reports were rapidly increasing housing and 
commercial property prices, global trade imbalances, historically low credit premiums, 
and weak US housing markets. Beginning with its December 2007 FSR, the Norges Bank 
focused in on four risks to the country‘s financial stability. These threats to financial 
stability were the risk of an international recession, higher liquidity risk due to the 
turmoil in money and credit markets, high household debt burdens in Norway, and 
excessive optimism in the country‘s commercial property markets. These four risks 28 
 
continued to be central to subsequent FSRs, although liquidity risk was acknowledged to 
be less of a concern after funding markets settled down globally and the Norges Bank 
took significant steps to create liquidity.   
The December 2009 FSR cited an improving risk outlook for the Norwegian 
economy and financial sector and included a number of ideas for reforming and 
improving financial regulation. The May 2010 FSR saw further improvement in 
Norwegian banks, but mentioned concerns about renewed market turbulence abroad 
arising from high levels of public debt in many other countries. 
Risk evaluation. The Norges Bank used a variety of tools to assess how the risks 
would affect financial stability and the condition of financial institutions. These tools 
included an analysis based on performance ratios and trends for the household, business, 
and financial sectors; business bankruptcy prediction models; bank failure and distance to 
default tests; and macroeconomic gap indicator analysis of financial vulnerability. The 
Norges Bank also used surveys of bank liquidity and lending, reviews of counterparty 
risk data, and comparisons of actual house prices with estimated long-run equilibrium 
values. 
The most comprehensive means used by the Norges Bank to test for resilience to 
financial shocks was a stress test that incorporated a macro model of the Norwegian 
economy. This model was further linked to models of the household, business and 
banking sectors (Andersen et al. (2008)). These models allowed a variety of shocks to be 
introduced, such as wage, price, and interest rate changes; shocks to consumer 
confidence; and credit squeezes, along with changes in other parameters. The effect of 
these shocks was then estimated on corporate credit quality and bankruptcies, housing 
prices and consumer lending, and capital adequacy, loan losses, and earnings at major 29 
 
Norwegian banks. A financial accelerator in the macro model provided feedback effects 
from financial markets to the general economy. 
In the FSR stress tests and other analysis that were used before the crisis 
worsened in late 2008, the primary focus was on domestic developments and declines in 
consumer confidence that might influence housing and property prices. The stress tests 
included both a baseline test reflecting expected outcomes and more severe scenarios 
incorporating significant shocks to the economy. Under the severe scenarios, significant 
declines in housing prices were one result of the tests, but such declines have not been 
experienced in Norway. However, the stress tests did capture much of the decline in 
economic and financial conditions that was beginning to reach Norway. They also 
indicated that the major Norwegian banks had enough capital to survive such 
circumstances. 
As the crisis worsened globally, the Norges Bank incorporated much more severe 
scenarios in its stress tests to reflect declining global conditions. These scenarios included 
significant declines in exports, very low oil revenue for Norway, and notably higher bank 
funding costs. A particularly severe stress test in the May 2009 FSR – one that was 
similar to what happened in the Norwegian banking crisis of 1988-1993 – suggested that 
the major banks would fall below minimum capital requirements if new capital was not 
found (Havro (2010)).  While these tests were much more severe than what actually 
occurred, they provided a good measure of the amount of capital banks would need to 
survive a major crisis and what could happen if the appropriate private and public steps 
were not followed.  
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IV.   EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORTS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MACROPRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION 
FSRs are a useful and publicly available surveillance tool. Many FSRs provide 
the types of broad-based information and insights that would be required as a basis for 
macroprudential supervision. The reports, for instance, can provide a systematic approach 
to tracking such key factors as household and corporate debt and income levels, housing 
and property prices, and various risk exposures across the financial system. The reports 
can also supply information about risks and potential problems that should give central 
banks, regulatory authorities, and financial institutions a better understanding of the 
financial environment. The information in FSRs can thus be a necessary precondition for 
preventing or responding to a financial crisis and could also prove to be an important 
element in macroprudential supervision.  
The FSRs reviewed in this analysis identified many of the risks that led to the 
financial crisis (Table 2). The reports noted that risk premiums for a wide range of 
financial assets were below historical norms. The FSRs also spotlighted a number of 
unsustainable financial and economic trends, such as rapidly increasing housing prices 
and historically high debt levels.  Other common conclusions were that banks and 
investors were searching for higher yields and increasing their leverage and that an abrupt 
change in market sentiments could lead to disruptions and liquidity problems. 
It should also be noted that although the reports identified many of the risks that 
led to the crisis, some were described as low probability events or not the most likely or 
plausible outcomes. In addition, the FSRs identified a number of other risks that did not 
have a direct role in the crisis or have not yet been realized to any significant extent. 
Among such risks were global trade imbalances, prolonged disruptions in energy 31 
 
markets, and major breakdowns in the financial infrastructure. From the standpoint of 
macroprudential supervision—where timely policy actions will need to be linked to 
identified risks—a more careful distinction may have to be drawn between likely and less 
likely outcomes. Also, the cost of responding to risks that may not be realized should be 
considered.     
While the FSRs did identify many critical risks, evaluating the timing and 
magnitude of these risks and their effects on the financial system was an even greater, if 
not impossible, challenge—both before and during this crisis. The FSRs, in fact, typically 
underestimated the severity of the crisis, which should not be too surprising, given its 
unprecedented nature and the fact that much of the crisis originated from events outside 
several of these countries. Also, like most crises, this one was triggered by a number of 
unique factors and a changing financial structure—all of which would be difficult to 
capture in traditional financial models and stress tests. Such thoughts were expressed in 
the Norges Bank‘s May 2009 FSR: ―It is difficult to estimate the probability and price the 
risk of all possible outcomes in financial markets. This applies particularly to events that 
occur rarely and have not occurred for a long time…The possibility of such shocks 
occurring may be given insufficient attention. In the long term, therefore, public 
authorities have an important role to play in maintaining a collective memory of previous 
crises.‖  
Similar thoughts were expressed in other publications. As noted in the October 
2007 UK FSR, ―the speed, force and breadth with which these risks combined was not 
fully anticipated by the authorities or market participants.‖
19 The changing structure of 
markets and the challenges posed by a more market-dominated, interconnected system 
were discussed by Andersson (2008): ―at the same time the market dynamics have 32 
 
become more difficult to predict and market shocks have an increasing rapid sequence of 
events.‖ 
The strongest tool used in FSRs to judge the effect of different risks was through 
stress testing (Table 4). Some of the severe scenario stress tests did succeed in capturing 
the capital needs of banks, as well as the economic downturns that later occurred. 
However, banks and policymakers may have been less likely to heed the warnings in the 
severe stress tests, because FSRs often described the scenarios and assumptions as 
unlikely or very low probability tail events rather than as expected outcomes. Among the 
other tests used to predict the likelihood of a crisis were comparisons between current 
house prices and estimates based on fundamental factors, gap indicators comparing actual 
values to historic trends, and counterparty risk measures (Table 3). In particular, some of 
the gap indicators provided a good picture of how rapid debt growth and substantial 
increases in asset prices provide a good—although not foolproof—leading indicator of 
financial crises. 
Each of these approaches thus has its strong points and weaknesses, and the use of 
multiple approaches is likely to be needed in assessing financial stability and conducting 
macroprudential supervision. The stress tests used in the FSRs, for instance, helped 
provide supervisors and bankers with a better guide to how much capital was needed and 
which institutions were most in need of it. The tests also provided some perspective on 
how selected events and risks might affect the financial system and helped to give a 
starting point for discussing various threats to financial stability and their magnitude. 
Such tests would thus potentially provide the type of insights needed in macroprudential 
supervision when assessing the amount of capital banks should hold and the likely impact 
of certain threats to the financial system.  33 
 
At the same time, though, macroprudential supervisors may find serious 
shortcomings in the use of stress tests and analytical tools. For instance, Alfaro and 
Drehmann (2009) suggest a number of drawbacks with macro stress tests, including the 
difficulty in capturing structural changes and market innovations, the limited number of 
risk factors in many models, and the failure to incorporate market dynamics and a range 
of feedback effects between the financial sector and the real economy. They further find 
that banking crises have often been preceded by favorable economic conditions – an 
indication that these crises may have been initiated by unexpected shocks or trigger 
events. This point would correspond to many of the FSRs, which reported strong 
economic and banking conditions as late as 2007, but were then surprised by the channels 
and the severity through which the crisis spread at the global level. 
The challenge of determining and quantifying the effect that particular risks might 
have on financial stability has a number of implications for macroprudential supervision. 
As those writing FSRs already know, there are dangers both from underestimating the 
threat of a crisis and from overestimating and overreacting to such threats. As a result, 
macroprudential supervisors will have to establish a good track record of identifying and 
assessing potential threats to financial stability. Macroprudential supervisors also may 
need strong evidence to overcome the political and public pressures that are likely to arise 
in any attempt to moderate or curtail credit booms and asset bubbles. We should further 
acknowledge that it is unrealistic to expect macroprudential supervision, just as with 
FSRs, to be the missing piece in our ability to prevent all, or even most, financial crises, 
which is a role many politicians are now giving to it. 
Another aspect of macroprudential supervision is that it will require a close 
linkage between those that analyze the broader financial picture and the supervisors that 34 
 
must implement policies to address any identified risks. In several countries, central 
banks were able to bring selected insights from their FSRs directly into the supervisory 
process and into ongoing discussions with banks, particularly when the central banks also 
had supervisory powers. Information from FSRs was of further help in deciding what 
form of public assistance should be provided during the crisis. However, FSRs would 
have been even more useful in the recent crisis if there had been a better way to tie the 
analysis with the supervisory process and to get regulatory authorities and financial 
institutions to respond more vigorously to the identified risks. Governor Stefan Ingves of 
the Riksbank noted that the bank issued ―repeated warning about the development of 
risks in Baltic countries and the fact that risk was priced too low in the financial markets. 
Unfortunately, our warnings in these cases were not sufficiently acted upon‖ (Ingves 
(2009)). 
Apart from accurately identifying risks developing in the financial system and 
recognizing the need to respond, macroprudential supervisors will also face a major 
challenge in overcoming the inherent delays associated with developing appropriate 
policy responses, implementing new regulations, and communicating supervisory policy 
changes through a large staff of examiners and individual institutions. The closer 
communication and supervisory linkages that many regulators are now pursuing with 
systemically important firms may provide one avenue for discussing and addressing 
identified risks in a more timely manner. Also, to the extent that macroprudential 
supervision can maintain the ―collective memory of previous crises‖—as described in the 
Norges Bank‘s FSR—market participants may be more likely to pay attention to 
warnings issued by public authorities and deal with emerging problems directly. The 
development of automatic or rules-based requirements for countercyclical capital, 35 
 
liquidity, reserves, or loan-to-value ratios could provide another means for dealing with 
potential regulatory delays.   
Given these difficulties in foreseeing a crisis and implementing corrective steps in 
time, it may be even more important to have macroprudential supervision focus on 
creating the type of financial system that is more resilient and less crisis-prone in the first 
place. Under this objective, identifying imbalances, misaligned incentives, and 
unsustainable trends in our financial system would still be essential. This knowledge, 
though, would not only be used to counter growing risk exposures and cyclical trends, but 
would also have a longer-term objective of establishing policies that could put the 
financial framework on sounder, more stable footings. This would mirror the approach 
that several countries have recently taken in their FSRs by discussing the structural 
weaknesses that led to the crisis and the policy options they could now implement to 
make lasting improvements to the financial system. Macroprudential supervision would 
still be concerned with preventing and mitigating crises, but with more thought given to 
the underlying structure of the financial system.             
V.   CONCLUSIONS 
The recent financial crisis has renewed interest in regulatory proposals to strengthen 
the global financial system and increase its inherent stability. Macroprudential supervision 
is a key piece of this regulatory reform debate, and a number of steps toward 
macroprudential supervision are already in the works, including the European Systemic 
Risk Board and the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the United States. Other recent 
steps and ideas with a macroprudential focus are countercyclical capital, reserve, and 
liquidity requirements; tighter supervision of systemically important firms; and better 36 
 
communications between financial supervisors and macroeconomic policymakers. 
With this ongoing interest in macroprudential supervision, it is important to take a 
careful look at what such supervision should be, how it would work, and what it could 
realistically be expected to accomplish. This article looked at FSRs as a tool for promoting 
financial stability and as an insight into macroprudential supervision and the challenges it 
could face. 
 In this analysis, we assessed whether the reports prepared by the UK, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, Spain, and Norway provided useful information before and during the 
crisis. Our general findings were that the FSRs in these countries were successful in 
identifying the risks that led to the financial crisis although they underestimated the 
effects and gave insufficient warning as to the magnitude of the crisis. During the crisis, 
FSRs may have given the central banks a better understanding of the resiliency of 
markets and institutions in their own countries and the types of policy responses needed 
as the crisis continued. Lessons learned during this crisis may enable FSRs to be an even 
more effective tool in the future  
Overall, preparing FSRs appears to be a worthwhile exercise that encourages 
central banks and international authorities to identify and monitor important financial 
trends and emerging risks and to develop a better understanding of the underlying 
structure of domestic and global financial markets. This understanding of financial 
markets and trends would also be an essential element in macroprudential supervision, 
and thus many of the steps taken in FSRs provide a good guide to what would be needed 
in implementing this supervisory approach. Much like FSRs, macroprudential 
supervision offers a means for creating a more resilient financial system and for 
responding quickly and appropriately to financial crises when they occur. The objective 37 
 
of anticipating and preventing financial crises may be a much stronger challenge for 
macroprudential supervision, as it has been for FSRs. 38 
 
Table 1 – Effect of the Financial Crisis 
 
 
Countries   Effect on the Economy 
(OECD statistics)   Effect on the Financial System   Policy Actions  
United Kingdom  
6 Quarters of GDP decline (Overall 
decline of 6.5%),  
Unemployment increased from 
5.1% to 7.9%  
Significant losses at financial 
institutions (FIs),  funding 
concerns,  collapse of several  large 
FIs – RBS, HBOS, Northern Rock   
Takeover of some FIs, central 
bank rate lowered and lending  
liberalized,  fiscal stimulus  
Sweden  
4 Quarters of GDP decline (Overall 
decline of 7.5%), 
Unemployment rose from 5.6% to 
9%  
Liquidity and longer-term funding 
issues, increase in bank loan losses  
Repo rate cut to .25%, state 
guarantee of bank liabilities,  more 
treasury bills issued  
Netherlands  
5 Quarters of GDP decline (Overall 
decline of 5.3%), 
Moderate rise in unemployment 
from 3.0% to 4.5%  
Losses on mortgage-related 
securities, collapse of Fortis  
Fortis takeover,  bank debt 
guarantees and capital injections  
Spain  
6 Quarters of GDP decline (Overall 
decline of 4.9%),  
Unemployment increased from 
7.9% to over 20%.  
Liquidity and real estate lending 
problems, several takeovers of 
savings banks  
Fiscal stimulus, deposit and debt 
guarantees,  and bank capital 
injections  
Norway  
Several Quarters of mild GDP 
declines (Overall decline of 2.8%), 
Moderate increase in 
unemployment from 2.3% to 3.6%  
Funding problems for banks relying 
on foreign sources, declines in bank 
earnings  
Central bank policy rate lowered 
significantly and lending 
increased, capital injections, bond 
exchanges  39 
 
Table 2 
What Risks Did the Countries Identify? 









in the U.S.  Other Risks 
United 
Kingdom 
―if risk premia rose 
abruptly, asset prices 
would fall sharply‖ 
July 2006 FSR 
Asset prices appear 
to remain high 




strong in aggregate, 
but there are signs of 
stress‖ 
July 2006 FSR 
―there is a risk of 
disorderly 
unwinding‖ 
July 2006 FSR 
The U.S. sub-prime 
market is not ―large 
enough to have a 
systemic effect on 
its own.‖ 
April 2007 FSR 




markets. Also taking 
on more potentially 
illiquid instruments. 
Sweden 
―The risk premium is 
historically low, which 
can entail rapid 
corrections to credit 
market prices.‖ 
Dec. 2006 FSR 
―The rapid increases 
in house prices and 
household debt 
cannot continue in 
the longer run.‖ 
Dec. 2006 FSR 
―growth of Swedish 
property companies‘ 
borrowing from 
banks has continued 
at a high rate‖  
Dec. 2006 FSR 
―current account 
deficits remain 
substantial [in the 
Baltic countries]‖ 
Dec. 2007 FSR 
―weakening of US 
economy [is]expect-
ed to have negative 
effects on growth in 
the euro area‖ 
June 2008 FSR 
Pronounced 
economic slowdown 
in Baltics, financial 
infrastructure 
Netherlands 
―a persistent risk 
tolerance, reflected 
in…low premiums for 
credit risk‖ 
March 2007 FSR 
―rise in house prices 
in the first half of 
2006 outpaced 
inflation by almost 
5%‖ 
Sept. 2006 FSR 
―[Netherlands‘] 
household debt… 
remains high in 
international 
comparisons‖  
March 2007 FSR 
―the scenario of a 
disorderly correction 
of global imbalances 
…does not appear 
implausible‖ 
March 2007 FSR 
―the liquidity 
squeeze…can be 
linked to spillover 
effects from the 
subprime crisis‖ 
Sept. 2007 FSR  
Oil price increases, 
complex credit 
products, limitations 
of credit ratings, 
spillovers from U.S. 
and other countries   
Spain 
―contributed...to a 
greater appetite for 
risk.‖ 
May 2006 FSR 
Declining trend of 
house price growth 
since 2004, but still 
high 
Household debt 
levels is a concern, 





savings rate and 
trade deficit) 
Slowing real estate 
activity and 
increased 
concentration risk in 
the U.S. 





―Risk premiums low in 
a historical context… 
increases vulnerability 
to negative economic 
shocks.‖ 
  Dec. 2006 FSR  
―long period of 
strong debt growth 
and asset price infla-
tion may be a source 
of instability‖ 
June 2006 FSR 
―Household debt 




June 2006 FSR 
―Global imbalances 
in trade and capital 
flows are steadily 
increasing.‖ 
 
June 2006 FSR 
―Developments in 
the US housing 
market represent a 
source of 
uncertainty.‖ 
Dec. 2006 FSR 
Commercial 
property market, 
banks may reduce 
their capital under 
Basel II, liquidity 
risk, avian flu 40 
 
Table 3 
What Did the Countries Use to Evaluate Risk? 
 
Countries  Financial Indicators and Ratios  Market Based Indicators 
Qualitative Indicators, 




Numerous charts based on ratio and 
trend analysis of global, corporate, 
household, and financial sectors  
Extensive use of market based 
data on a range of different 
issues 
Data on counterparty 
exposures among the largest 
FIs, market and systemic risk 
surveys 
Projected market values of 
mortgage-backed securities, 
modeling household distress, 
etc. 
Sweden 
Numerous charts based on ratio and 
trend analysis of banks and their 
customers -- companies, households, 
and foreign borrowers  
Price data on equities, bonds, 
real estate, CDS, etc. 
Household finance data, 
expected default frequencies 
from KMV data, risk survey 
of market participants 
Failure of a major 
counterparty, effect of 
increased funding costs, 
household debt servicing 
ability 
Netherlands 
Charts and tables of economic and 
financial data that varied from one FSR 
to another (Many financial indicators 
are also on the Bank‘s website)  
Some FSRs included charts on 
equity prices, CDS, credit 
ratings, etc. 
Bank lending survey 
Housing market correction, 
vulnerable households, avian 
flu, macro model of liquidity 
stress 
Spain 
Extensively use of trend and ratio 
analysis with  financial statement and 
regulatory data 
Used to a lesser extent  Data on all loans over €6,000 
originated in Spain 
Quality of Spanish MBS and 
comparison of Spanish and 
U.S. mortgage markets 
Norway 
Tables and charts with data and 
performance ratios on companies, 
households, and banks   
Market data on equity and real 
estate prices 
Bank lending survey, survey 
of counterparty exposures, 
bank liquidity survey 
Gap indicator analysis using 
actual values vs. historical 
trend, bank failure 




How Did the Countries Conduct Their Stress Tests? 
 
Country  Type of Model  Financial Institutions 
Included 
Assumptions Used in 
Stress Tests  General Results 
United Kingdom 
Macro forecasting model with 
added models for household, 
corporate, and banking sectors 
Major UK banks 
2006 severe global corporate 
stress scenario: 
1.5% decline in UK GDP 
25% drop in house prices 
35% drop for com. prop.   
Losses equivalent to 15%-
30% of Tier 1 capital (Stress 
test results became more 
qualitative after 2007)  
Sweden  Loan portfolio model  Four largest banks 
2009:1 Test – 2 years of 
annual loan losses of: 
1.3% on loans in Sweden 
10% on loans in Baltics 
30% on loans in Ukraine 
All four banks continue to 
meet Tier 1 capital 
requirements, but several 
have significant capital 
declines 
Netherlands 
Macro forecasting model, plus 
stress tests run by individual 
banks on their own models 
Banks, insurance companies, 
and pension funds 
Varies by FSR – severe test 
included 2-year drop in GDP 
of  6.3% and home prices of 
30%, unemployment at 9.7% 
At large banks, Tier 1 capital 
fell by 4 percentage points 
but remained well above 
minimum standards 
Spain  Credit risk model  All depository institutions 
Four quarters of consecutive 
declines in GDP similar to the 
1993 recession. Two years 
before previous growth rate 
resumes. 
Considerable increase in 
credit risk, but ―…this shock 
would not jeopardize the 
strength of Spanish 
institutions.‖ 
Norway 
Macro model with separate 
models added on for the 
household, enterprise, and 
financial sectors 
Five or six largest banks 
Varies by FSR -- most severe 
test  similar to last crisis and 
assumed sharp fall in exports, 
oil prices, and foreign funding  
Banks have a significant 
capital shortage under the 
most severe test, but  
generally adequate capital in 





Stress tests or scenario analyses—the terms are used interchangeably—are 
computer simulations that assess the effects of one or more large risks or shocks on the 
financial system. Stress tests are used to identify the types and sizes of risks that can 
create instability in the financial system. The FSRs from the UK, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Spain, and Norway use stress testing to assess the impact of various risks to 
their financial systems. This section explains how stress tests are conducted using an 
example from the Bank of England‘s (BOE) 2006 FSR.
 (Haldane et al. (2007)).  
Stress testing requires four steps:  describe the risk to be modeled; design a stress 
scenario that incorporates the risk; model how the risk is transmitted to the financial 
system; and estimate the impact on the financial system.  
While the BOE identified several risks to be modeled, this example will look at 
the risk related to household debt levels. Rising debt relative to household income could 
lead to higher defaults and lower household credit capacity, especially if economic 
conditions deteriorate. 
The BOE designed a moderate and a severe stress scenario to assess the 
household debt risk. The severe scenario was based on economic conditions during the 
UK‘s early 1990s recession. The severe scenario assumed that GDP for the year would 
decline by 1.4 percent, unemployment would rise to 10 percent, and housing prices would 
fall by 23 percent. This was judged a large enough shock so as to be unlikely but still 
plausible. 43 
 
The BOE next modeled how these scenario shocks would affect banks and the 
financial system. The scenarios were assumed to affect credit risk, earnings risk and 
funding risks for banks. Declining economic conditions increased banks‘ credit risk 
through higher write-offs on consumer loans. Lower GDP and higher unemployment 
make households more likely to default, and falling house prices increase the loss rate on 
defaulted loans. Larger write-offs would reduce bank earnings and capital. Furthermore, 
earnings risk would grow because higher defaults and declining credit capacity would 
reduce loan balances and, thus, interest income and fee income. Finally, funding risk 
would be higher because lower bank earnings and capital cause creditors to demand 
higher rates on bank debts, which would increase funding costs. 
The BOE used computer simulations to estimate the impact that the stress test 
scenarios have on the banking and financial systems‘ resiliency. The mathematical 
relationships in the stress test can become quite complex, especially when incorporating 
the macroeconomic effects. The BOE and many other central banks use macroeconomic 
forecasting models that enable the economic variables in the model to change and evolve 
in a reasonable and consistent manner. 
The impact of the stress scenarios on banks is shown through key financial ratios 
or measures. The BOE results are shown as a change from an expected or base case 
scenario. In assessing risks from rising household debt under the severe scenario, the 
stress test found that aggregate bank income fell by £25 billion, or 16 percent of 
regulatory (Tier 1) capital. In some FSRs, the results include a range of values to reflect 
the uncertainty or imprecision in the estimates or the range of individual bank changes. 
Reasonable and robust stress testing is very difficult to do. Good scenario design 
requires careful thought and analysis. The mathematical relationships in the model can be 44 
 
difficult to estimate and calibrate, especially when there are a variety of indirect effects 
with important consequences. However, stress testing can be the best method for 
understanding the impact of risks that could lead to financial instability.45 
 
BOX 2 
COUNTERPARTY RISK REPORTS IN SWEDEN 
 
An important financial stability concern in Sweden is counterparty risk, especially 
since much of Swedish banking is concentrated in four large banks. As a result, mutual 
exposures among these banks can be substantial and could pose a contagion or systemic 
risk if one bank failed.  
The Riksbank and its Financial Stability Department have collected data since 
June 1999 on counterparty exposures at each of the four major banks. Banks report on 
both on– and off–balance sheet exposures to each of their 15 largest counterparties at the 
end of each quarter. Banks report their gross exposures along with any risk-reducing 
instruments,  such  as  netting  provisions,  collateral,  or  credit  default  swaps.  The  key 
categories  in  the  exposure  data  are  securities,  derivative  instruments,  and  unsecured 
lending, such as deposit holdings, overnight loans, and loan commitments.
1    
The  Riksbank  calculates  each  bank‘s  net  exposure  to  each  of  its  15  largest 
counterparties and then compares these numbers to the bank‘s Tier 1 capital. In testing for 
contagion risk, the Riksbank assumes a major bank defaults on its payments with only a 25 
percent recovery rate. The resulting losses are deducted from capital at the other banks to 
see if they would still have sufficient capital or, in the extreme, pose further contagion 
risks. The chart below shows the projected Tier 1 capital ratio at the Swedish bank with the 
least capital remaining after this test. 46 
 
Chart 1 
THE  MAJOR  BANK  WITH  THE  LOWEST  TIER  1  
CAPITAL  RATIO  AFTER  ANOTHER  MAJOR  BANK  DEFAULTED  ON 
PAYMENTS 
1999-2007 (The Tier 1 capital ratio is in percentage terms.) 
 
Source: The Riksbank 
 
The  quarterly  data  provide  helpful  insights  into  the  risk  exposures  that  major 
Swedish banks have to each other and to other parties. Allowances must be made because 
counterparty exposures can change very rapidly, and such exposures can be valued in 
different  ways,  depending  on  the  treatment  of  any  risk-reducing  features.
2  Moreover, 
outcomes in a crisis may be much different than in normal times, especially if there is a 
second wave of failures.  
BOX 2 ENDNOTES 
1For more information on how this data is collected, see Financial Stability Report 
1999:2, Sveriges Riksbank, pp. 36-41; and Financial Stability Report 2008:2, Sveriges 
Riksbank, p. 77. 
2According  to  one  Riksbank  publication,  many  of  these  data  limitations  could  be 47 
 
overcome during unstable periods, because the Riksbank and the reporting banks now have 
―routines  and  definitions  for  being  able  to  produce  these  figures  quickly  if  a  crisis  is 
imminent‖ (Andersson, p. 16). 
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ENDNOTES 
1This study will focus on FSRs published by central banks in individual countries. 
However, FSRs are published also by the International Monetary Fund and the European 
Central Bank. For example, see International Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability 
Report,  Navigating  the  Financial  Challenges  Ahead,  October  2009;  and  European 
Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, December 2009. 
2In general, the results of these surveillance and monitoring programs are not publicly 
available. One exception was the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, where U.S. 
regulatory  agencies  estimated  future  capital  levels  for  the  19  largest  banking 
organizations under scenarios that included significant declines in economic conditions. 
The results were released publicly in April 2009. 
Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, the 
Office  of  Financial  Research,  which  supports  the  new  Financial  Stability  Oversight 
Council, will report annually to Congress on ―potential emerging threats to the financial 
stability of the United States.‖ 
3Oosterloo et al. (2007), page 338. 
4Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, December 2009, page 5. 
5The  ECB  website  (http://www.ecb.int/pub/fsr/html/index.en.html)  defines  financial 
stability  ―as  a  condition  in  which  the  financial  system—comprising  of  financial 
intermediaries,  markets  and  market  infrastructures—is  capable  of  withstanding  shocks, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of disruptions in the financial intermediation process which 
are severe enough to significantly impair the allocation of savings to profitable investment 
opportunities.‖    The  Oesterreichische  Nationalbank,  Austria‘s  central  bank 
(http://www.oenb.at/en/finanzm_stab/–finanzmarktstabilitaet/– 
finanzmarktstabilitaet.jsp#tcm:16-1060) notes that ―financial stability refers to a situation 
in which the financial markets fulfill their allocation function in a satisfactory manner, even 
in the case of shocks.‖ 
6Activities that create risks for the individual financial institution and for the financial 
system may lead to an under–provision of risk abatement. The financial institution has 
incentives to reduce its own risk exposures, but not the system-level exposures, since it 
does  not  face these risks  directly. Economists refer to  risks  like these systemic risks 
(those not faced directly by individual institutions) as externalities. Externalities can lead 
to a less than socially optimal level of risk or cost abatement. 
Supervision of financial institutions is also subject to problems with  externalities. 
Currently,  most  supervisory  oversight  is  focused  on  risk  exposures  within  individual 
institutions. The recent financial crisis, though, has prompted much discussion on how 
public authorities should expand their focus to the overall level of risk–taking in financial 
markets through ―macroprudential supervision.‖ 
7For example, central banks with responsibility for supervising financial institutions 
are generally unable to publish surveillance reports based on confidential examination 
findings or other confidential supervisory correspondence. 
8Oosterloo et al. (2007) looked at the use of financial soundness indicators across a 
large number of FSRs. 
9Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, April 2007, p. 10. 
10Serious  housing  problems  were  avoided  in  Sweden  due  to  little  over–building, 49 
 
almost no lending to households with poor credit histories, the important role Swedish 
banks  play  in  holding  mortgages  and  controlling  their  credit  risk,  and  the  fact  that 
Swedish  households  remain  liable  for  any  remaining  mortgage  debt  even  after 
foreclosure. 
11The first 2006 FSR has an article which describes how the Riksbank uses external 
information and a portfolio model to measure credit risk and expected losses at Sweden‘s 
four largest banks (see pages 75-88 of this report). The following FSRs describe the 
assumptions and calculations used in each of the credit quality scenarios.  
12De Nederlandsche Bank, Overview of Financial Stability in the Netherlands, March 
2007, No. 5, p 4. 
13Although not referenced its reports, the DNB posts on its website a spreadsheet with 
the  current  and  historical  financial  stability  indicators,  both  core  and  supplemental, 
suggested by the IMF (www.statistics.dnb.nl/index.cgi?lang=uk&todo=fs). 
14De  Nederlandsche  Bank,  Overview  of  Financial  Stability  in  the  Netherlands, 
September 2008, pp. 5, 6. 
15For example, the March 2007 report included the results of three top down scenarios: 
a ―malaise‖ scenario, a ―global correction‖ scenario, and a ―housing market correction‖ 
scenario. The malaise scenario incorporated economic stagnation and falling bond yields. 
The global correction scenario assumed disorderly correction of global imbalances, sharply 
rising  bond  yields,  and  substantial  dollar  depreciation.  The  housing  market  correction 
scenario included an initial rise in bond yields, a 30 percent drop in housing prices over 
three years leading to a slowdown in economic growth, and falling interest rates and equity 
markets. The scenarios were run using the DNB‘s MORKMON econometric forecasting 
model.  
16De Nederlandsche Bank, Overview of Financial Stability in the Netherlands, March 
2007, p. 13. 
17Additionally, the securitization process in Spain differed from that in the United 
States. Spanish banks, for instance, retained a large portion of credit risk on their books 
and used securitization primarily as a means of obtaining funding. 
18Doubtful  assets  ―are  considered  unlikely  to  be  fully  or  partially  repaid  on  the 
contractually agreed terms, either due to customer arrears or for other reasons (if the 
institution has reasonable doubts regarding their recovery),‖ Banco de España, Financial 
Stability Report, Spring 2006, p. 88. 
19Bank of England, Financial Stability Report, October 2007, p. 40. 
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STRUCTURE  OF  FINANCIAL  STABILITY  REPORTS  IN  THE  UNITED  KINGDOM, 
SWEDEN, NETHERLANDS, AND SPAIN 
 
Financial Stability Reports in the United Kingdom 
The  key  goal  of  the  Bank  of  England‘s  FSRs  is  to  identify  risks  to  the  UK 
financial system and bring about a better understanding, evaluation, communication, and 
mitigation of these risks.  The focus  of the FSRs  and their analysis is  mainly on the 
financial system as a whole, as opposed to individual institutions. This includes not only 
the major UK banks, but also the markets and the infrastructures. A shock to any of these 
functions  is  assumed  to  have  a  greater  systemic  impact  on  the  UK  financial  system 
compared to other sectors.  
The Bank of England‘s FSRs generally consist of four sections. The first section 
reviews developments in the global financial system since the previous report and their 
impact on risks to the UK economy. The second section analyzes how the developments 
feed through to the UK financial system. The third section assesses the resilience of the 
UK  financial  system.  Lastly,  section  four  discusses  actions  required  from  market 
participants, public authorities, and at the international level to mitigate the risks in the 
system.  
The UK‘s FSRs have developed and grown in content as the financial turmoil 
expanded. Not surprisingly, the reports evolved from a more domestic focus to a broader 
view of the risks in the global financial sector. The stress testing also evolved and grew in 
importance,  both  in  the  reports  and  at  individual  institutions.  The  reports  conducted 53 
 
systemic  stress  tests  of  the  financial  system  against  highly  unlikely  severe  shocks 
throughout much of the crisis.  
The  reports  extensively  use  market  data,  data  from  financial  institutions,  and 
market surveys. In addition, the UK‘s Financial Services Authority collects quarterly data 
on counterparty  exposures  among large financial  institutions,  and this  information,  is 
presented in the FSRs. 
Financial Stability Reports in Sweden 
In 1997, the Sveriges Riksbank became the first central bank to begin publishing a 
separate, semiannual FSR. The need for this report grew out of the Swedish banking 
crisis and real estate collapse of the early 1990s and the realization that policymakers 
must do a better job of identifying the risks in the financial sector and addressing threats 
to financial stability. In this regard, the forward to recent Swedish FSRs states that ―An 
ongoing analysis of stability provides possibilities for the early detection of changes and 
vulnerabilities that together can lead to a serious crisis,‖ and ―A thorough analysis also 
facilitates the management of a crisis if one were to occur.‖  To incorporate the reports 
into central bank thought and policy, the Executive Board of the Riksbank now discusses 
each new report at its meetings. 
The Riksbank‘s FSR has evolved to a fairly consistent format, beginning with a 
summary statement of the report‘s overall stability assessment and a summary of the risks 
in financial markets. The main part of the report consists of a review of the condition, 
risk, and prospects of different borrower groups at Swedish banks—the household sector, 
corporate  sector,  commercial  property  market,  and  foreign  borrowers;  an  analysis  of 
profitability  at  Swedish  banks  and  their  credit,  liquidity,  and  contagion  risks;  and 54 
 
occasional articles on special topics. With the globalization of finance and the manner in 
which the current crisis spread across countries, the report pays increasing attention to 
economic and financial developments in other countries and their implications for the 
Swedish financial system. 
In assessing the prospects and credit risk of the different borrower groups, the 
report examines such factors as trends in various debt ratios by sector, changes in house 
and commercial property values, and history of borrower incomes, defaults, and other 
relevant statistics. The Riksbank also conducts a number of stress tests on household debt 
servicing ability, including how rising unemployment or higher interest rates might affect 
the outcome. 
Since the four major banks in Sweden have controlled 75 percent to 80 percent of 
the Swedish public‘s deposits and borrowings in recent years, the banking section in the 
FSR focuses largely on the profitability and risk exposures of these four banks. A number 
of stress tests are made in the reports with respect to each bank‘s resilience to various 
risks, including domestic credit risk, foreign lending risk, liquidity risk that might arise 
from  an  increase  in  funding  costs,  and  contagion  risk  as  measured  by  the  banks‘ 
counterparty exposures to each other. During the crisis, the Riksbank performed several 
credit risk stress tests, including one scenario based on expected loan losses and a more 
severe scenario incorporating notably higher loan losses. 
The Riksbank makes use of a variety of data sources in its FSR. These include a 
risk survey of participants in the Swedish fixed income and foreign exchange markets, an 
annual  household  finance  survey  supplemented  by  individual  tax  filings,  external 
measures of credit quality, and quarterly reports to the Riksbank from the four major 
banks on their 15 largest counterparty exposures to each other. 55 
 
Financial Stability Reports in the Netherlands 
De Nederlandsche Bank is the national bank of the Netherlands. On a semiannual 
basis, it publishes its financial stability report ―Overview of Financial Stability in the 
Netherlands.‖  The reports review the current  economic and financial  conditions  and 
assess the potential risks facing Dutch banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. 
Dutch FSRs follow a standard format. The introduction gives a brief overview of 
the report and provides an assessment of the stability of the Dutch financial system. The 
second  section  reviews  developments  in  the  international  economic  and  financial 
environment,  highlighting  aspects  that  generate  risks  for  Dutch  institutions.  The  next 
section reviews the corporate and household sectors of the Dutch economy, looking for 
imbalances and weaknesses that may lead to problems for the economy or the financial 
system. The fourth section reviews the financial condition of the banking, insurance, and 
pension sectors and identifies weaknesses and risks that could lead to systemic problems. 
The financial infrastructure is reviewed in the fifth section. This section looks at the 
payments system, securities and derivatives settlement systems, and risk management 
practices of financial firms. A concluding section of the report provides a summary. 
To identify and assess risks to the financial sector, De Nederlandsche Bank uses 
data on the household, corporate, and Dutch and international financial sectors and also 
analyzes financial ratios to ascertain the condition of financial firms. The Dutch central 
bank further uses a scenario analysis or set of stress tests to measure the possible effects of 
the identified risks on financial institutions and financial stability. The central bank uses its 
own econometric forecasting model to run many of these tests and also has asked major 
banks to run their own liquidity tests and other risk assessments. De Nederlandsche Bank‘s 56 
 
 tests  have  included  such  scenarios  as  economic  stagnation,  disruptions  from  global 
imbalances, substantial dollar depreciation, and significant drops in housing prices. 
Financial Stability Reports in Spain 
Spain publishes a semiannual FSR with the goal of promoting financial stability 
and communicating  the trends  and risks  seen in the financial system  to  the financial 
sector and, to a lesser extent, the public. A further rationale behind these FSRs is that the 
identified risks could possibly be mitigated if the reports adopt an effective and forward-
looking approach.  
The structure of the Spanish  report, which has not  changed significantly over 
time,  is  mainly  built  around  the  banking  system.  Though  other  financial  market 
participants,  such  as  insurance  companies,  pension  funds,  mutual  funds,  etc.,  are 
discussed in the FSRs, they are analyzed on a much smaller scale. The core part, the 
depository  institutions,  is  divided  into  three  banking  parts:  risks,  profitability,  and 
solvency. In all sections, the reports generally look at consolidated data. However, the 
FSRs include some distributional calculations to provide a more individualistic look at 
bank behavior.  
The  banking  risk  section  uses  a  consolidated  balance  sheet  analysis  generally 
focused  on  bank  lending  to  households  and  corporations.  This  section  also  looks  at 
doubtful  assets,  loan  loss  provisions,  loan  defaults,  and  funding  issues.  Since  the 
continued profitability of banks is central to coping with financial instability, the Spanish 
reports examine the consolidated income statements of depository institutions and various 
financial ratios, such as returns on assets, returns on equity, and efficiency ratios. In this 
profitability section, a number of market indicators, including CDS spreads and equity 57 
 
prices  for  Spanish  banks,  are  analyzed  and  compared  to  other  countries‘  banks.  The 
solvency section focuses on the capitalization of the banks and looks at such indicators as 
solvency ratios and Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital ratios.  
As the crisis unfolded, the FSRs added a section reviewing macroeconomic and 
international issues. Further, the reports generally contain additional sections on such 
topics as changes in policy, regulation, or current developments. 
Financial Stability Reports in Norway 
Norway  has  published  separate,  semiannual  FSRs  since  2000.  However,  the 
Norges Bank first began producing internal reports on the financial sector and its outlook 
in 1995 and then published excerpts from these reports in its Economic Bulletin between 
1997 and 1999. The main conclusions from these FSRs are summarized and submitted to 
the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  are  also  discussed  at  a  meeting  of  the  Norges  Bank‘s 
Executive  Board.  The  Norges  Bank  views  financial  stability  as  one  of  its  primary 
objectives in its efforts to promote economic stability and fulfill its lender of last resort 
and payments system roles. In its FSRs, the Norges Bank characterizes financial stability 
as when ―the financial system is robust to disturbances in the economy and can channel 
capital, execute payments and redistribute risk in a satisfactory manner.‖ 
The FSRs in Norway begin with an editorial or forward by a key central bank 
official. Next is ―The outlook for financial stability,‖ which typically contains a summary 
of the economic climate, the risk outlook or the risks to financial stability in Norway, 
and, when important, a discussion of policy actions that have been taken or might need to 
be adopted. The main body of the reports contains  separate sections  on international 
financial markets and global challenges, the Norwegian financial sector, the outlook for 58 
 
Norwegian borrowers, and stress tests of banks‘ capital adequacy, projected losses, and 
profitability. The FSRs also contain short articles or boxes to cover topics of current 
interest or to explain in more detail some of the stress tests and analysis used in the 
reports. An appendix to the reports contains tables with data on the structure, balance 
sheets, and income of Norwegian financial institutions and other sectors of the economy. 
The section on international financial markets examines global trends of current 
interest, and during the financial crisis, this section has looked at such topics as changes 
in credit spreads in major countries, differences in GDP growth, individual country credit 
quality measures and loan surveys, international equity indices, and central bank balance 
sheets. In the banking and financial section, the FSRs analyze a wide variety of trends, 
including trends in bank profitability, interest margins, funding sources, nonperforming 
loans  and  loan  losses,  and  capital  and  other  balance  sheet  items.  The  outlook  for 
Norwegian  borrowers  section  looks  at  both  households  and  enterprises,  with  a  more 
focused discussion on several industries of particular importance to Norway, including 
shipping, commercial property, and oil and gas. For households, the analysis reviews 
trends  in  income,  savings,  debt  service  burdens,  housing  prices,  and  mortgage 
instruments. For businesses, such items as earnings, equity, funding, and debt service 
capacity  trends  are  analyzed,  while  several  FSRs  have  also  forecasted  or  calculated 
business default and bankruptcy probabilities and commercial property values. 
Beyond standard financial data and trends analysis, the Norges Bank‘s FSRs take 
advantage of several  specialized data sources  and financial tests.  Detailed household, 
business, housing, and property data are collected by the national government, industry 
associations, and the Norges Bank and used in the FSRs. In conjunction with the financial 
supervisor, the Norges Bank conducts an annual survey of counterparty exposures at the 59 
 
largest Norwegian banks and assesses what might happen if a major counterparty failed 
to meet its obligations. The Norges Bank has also instituted a quarterly survey of bank 
lending. For FSR stress tests, the Norges Bank uses a combined set of models: a small 
macro model for testing alternative economic scenarios, micro models of the corporate 
and  household  sectors  to  estimate  how  these  groups  and  their  credit  risk  would  be 
affected by the economic scenarios, and a bank model to test the resulting outcome for 
the  largest  Norwegian  banks.  The  FSRs  further  incorporate  research  summaries  on 
current issues and specialized tests developed by Norges Bank economists.   
   
 
 